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Abstract
Wireless sensor networks are built upon a shared medium that makes it easy for
adversaries to conduct radio interference, or jamming, attacks that effectively cause
a denial of service of either transmission or reception functionalities. These attacks
can easily be accomplished by an adversary by either bypassing MAC-layer proto-
cols or emitting a radio signal targeted at jamming a particular channel. In this
article we survey different jamming attacks that may be employed against a sensor
network. In order to cope with the problem of jamming, we discuss a two-phase
strategy involving the diagnosis of the attack, followed by a suitable defense strate-
gy. We highlight the challenges associated with detecting jamming. To cope with
jamming, we propose two different but complementary approaches. One approach
is to simply retreat from the interferer, which may be accomplished by either spec-
tral evasion (channel surfing) or spatial evasion (spatial retreats). The second
approach aims to compete more actively with the interferer by adjusting resources,
such as power levels and communication coding, to achieve communication in the
presence of the jammer.
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ecuring sensor networks is a challenging task due to
the limited resources associated with low-cost sensor
hardware. The combination of the commodity
nature of wireless technologies and an increasingly
sophisticated user base means that adversaries are able to eas-
ily gain access to communications between sensor devices by
purchasing their own device and running it in a monitor
mode. Conventional cryptographic security mechanisms are
being translated to the sensor domain in order to defend
against attacks like packet injection and spoofing network-
level control information. However, in spite of the progress
being made to apply network security in the sensor realm,
sensor networks will remain vulnerable to attacks that target
their use of the wireless medium.
The wireless medium allows for radio interference attacks
that target communications. Unlike traditional denial of ser-
vice attacks, which are concerned with filling user domain
and kernel domain buffers, jamming attacks exploit the
shared nature of the wireless medium in order to prevent
devices from communicating or receiving. Such attacks on
the physical (PHY) layer have been known by the communi-
cations and radar community for some time, and there are
numerous texts, such as [1, 2], which discuss the issues asso-
ciated with these attacks. Typically, in the context of tradi-
tional communication systems, the objective of the jammer is
to deny the reception of communications at the receiver
using as little power as possible. In these systems jamming is
usually addressed through spreading techniques, whereby
resilience to interference is achieved by transmitting infor-
mation using a bandwidth much larger than its required min-
imum bandwidth. Often, this spreading is also used to
achieve multiple access, as in code-division multiple access
(CDMA) cellular systems.
With the exception of some military systems, most com-
modity sensor and wireless networks do not employ suffi-
ciently strong spreading techniques to survive jamming or
to achieve multiple access. Instead, for reasons of cost, sys-
tems like the Berkeley MICA2, the Zigbee (e.g., MICAZ),
and even 802.11 are based on a carrier sensing approach to
multiple access. Because of their use of carrier sensing for
medium access control (MAC), these systems are suscepti-
ble to a simple and severe jamming problem: an adversary
can simply disregard the medium access protocol and con-
tinually transmit on a wireless channel. By doing so, he or
she either prevents users from being able to commence
with legitimate MAC operations, or introduces packet colli-
sions that force repeated backoffs, or even jams transmis-
sions.  Such MAC and PHY layer security threats for
wireless networks have been revisited recently by the Aus-
tralian CERT [3], and will be a critical vulnerability for
wireless sensor networks.
In this article we survey issues related to jamming sensor
networks by examining both the attack and defend sides of
the problem. We present different jamming attack strategies
that might be used against sensor networks. Later, we exam-
ine methods that can be employed by the sensor network in
order to detect the presence of jamming. We illustrate that
basic statistics alone (e.g., signal strength) are not sufficient
for classifying the presence of a jammer, and more advanced
detection methods are needed. We examine two strategies for
coping with jamming. The first strategy involves avoiding the
jammer in either the spectral or spatial sense, and can be
achieved by changing channel allocations or, in mobile sensor
networks, by moving nodes away from the jammer. The sec-
ond strategy involves competing with the jammer by adjusting
the transmission power levels and employing error correction
in order to have more resilience against jamming. Finally, we
present concluding remarks.
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Jamming Attacks
There are many different attack strategies an adversary can
use to jam wireless communications [4–6], as depicted in Fig.
1. While it is impractical to cover all the possible attack mod-
els that might exist, in this article we review a wide range of
jammers that have proven to be effective.
Constant jammer: The constant jammer continually emits a
radio signal, and can be implemented using either a waveform
generator that continuously sends a radio signal [7] or a nor-
mal wireless device that continuously sends out random bits to
the channel without following any MAC-layer etiquette [4].
Normally, the underlying MAC protocol allows legitimate
nodes to send out packets only if the channel is idle. Thus, a
constant jammer can effectively prevent legitimate traffic
sources from getting hold of a channel and sending packets.
Deceptive jammer: Instead of sending out random bits, the
deceptive jammer constantly injects regular packets to the
channel without any gap between subsequent packet transmis-
sions. As a result, a normal communicator will be deceived into
believing there is a legitimate packet and be duped to remain in
the receive state. For example, in TinyOS, if a preamble is
detected, a node remains in the receive mode, regardless of
whether that node has a packet to send or not. Even if a node
has packets to send, it cannot switch to the send state because a
constant stream of incoming packets will be detected.
Random jammer: Instead of continuously sending out a
radio signal, a random jammer alternates between sleeping
and jamming. Specifically, after jamming for a while, it turns
off its radio and enters a “sleeping” mode. It will resume jam-
ming after sleeping for some time. During its jamming phase,
it can behave like either a constant jammer or a deceptive
jammer. This jammer model tries to take energy conservation
into consideration, which is especially important for those
jammers that do not have unlimited power supply.
Reactive jammer: The three models discussed above are
active jammers in the sense that they try to block the channel
irrespective of the traffic pattern on the channel.
Active jammers are usually effective because
they keep the channel busy all the time. As we
shall see in the following section, these methods
are relatively easy to detect. An alternative
approach to jamming wireless communication is
to employ a reactive strategy. The reactive jam-
mer stays quiet when the channel is idle, but
starts transmitting a radio signal as soon as it
senses activity on the channel. One advantage of
a reactive jammer is that it is harder to detect.
In our work [4] we implemented the above
four jammer models using Berkeley Motes that
employ a ChipCon CC1000 RF transceiver and
use TinyOS as the operating system. We
bypassed the MAC protocol, so the jammer can
blast on the channel irrespective of other activi-
ties taking place. We observed that the level of
interference a jammer causes is governed by sev-
eral factors, such as the distance between the
jammer and a normal wireless node, the relative
transmission power of the jammer and normal
nodes, and the MAC protocol employed by nor-
mal nodes. The MAC protocol decides whether
the channel is idle if the measured signal
strength value is lower than a threshold. Many
MAC protocols, such as the one in TinyOS
release 1.1.1, use a fixed threshold value, while
others, such as BMAC [8], adapt the threshold
value based on the measured signal strength val-
ues when a channel is idle. As a result, these two different
categories of MAC protocols decide the channel is jammed
differently. We briefly summarize the results of our experi-
ments. We had three parties, A, B, and X, where A and B are
normal wireless nodes with A being the sender, B the receiv-
er, and X is a jammer using one of our four models. More
details of the experimental setup can be found in [4].
A jammer can interfere with normal communications
between two legitimate communicators in two ways: preventing
the sender from sending out packets, or preventing the receiv-
er from receiving packets. Hence, we use the resulting packet
send ratio (PSR) and packet delivery ratio (PDR) to measure
the effectiveness of a jammer. Our experiments showed that all
four jammers are quite effective in interfering with normal
communications. The constant jammer can successfully pre-
vent a node from sending out packets if that node employs a
MAC protocol with a fixed threshold. Irrespective of the MAC
protocol, the PDR is very poor, because the packets that man-
age to get sent out (e.g., where BMAC is employed) are cor-
rupted anyway. The deceptive jammer, on the other hand, can
completely block the send operations in any case because the
sender will be forced to stay in receive mode all the time. The
random jammer alternates between sleeping and jamming.
While sleeping, the network operations will be normal; while
jamming, it behaves just like a constant or deceptive jammer,
depending on in which mode it operates. Finally, the reactive
jammer does not affect the send ratio, but all the packets are
corrupted, resulting in a zero PDR.
Detecting Jamming Attacks in Sensor
Networks
Detecting jamming attacks is important because it is the first
step toward building a secure and dependable wireless net-
work. Detecting radio interference attacks is challenging as it
involves discriminating between legitimate and adversarial causes
n Figure 1. Jamming attacks target a sensor’s ability to transmit or receive pack-
ets. Different jamming models accomplish the objective of blocking communi-
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of poor connectivity. In particular, legitimate scenarios for
poor connectivity, such as congestion and device failures, may
be difficult to differentiate from jamming.
There are several statistics that naturally lend themselves to
detecting jamming, such as signal strength, carrier sensing
time, and packet delivery ration. We will look at these differ-
ent measurements and discuss how they are not effective in
detecting a jamming attack. In order to repair the ability to
detect a jamming attack, more sophisticated methods are
needed, and we will discuss one possibility involving multi-
modal methods.
Basic Statistics
Signal Strength — One natural measurement that can be
employed to detect jamming is signal strength. The rationale
behind using this measurement is that the signal strength dis-
tribution may be affected by the presence of a jammer. Two
natural approaches to detecting jamming using signal strength
involve comparing average signal magnitude vs. a threshold
calculated from the ambient noise levels, and classifying the
shape of a window of signal samples.
In order to illustrate the effect a jammer would have on the
received signal strength, we present results of several experi-
ments conducted with the MICA2 Mote platform in Fig. 2.
These experiments are described in more detail in [4]. In the
first two experiments we have two Motes, a sender A and a
receiver B, which are 30 in apart. The top two plots corre-
spond to normal, or benign, traffic scenarios where the source
A transmits at a constant bit rate (CBR) of 5.28 kb/s, while
the second plot corresponds to A transmitting at its maximum
send rate, a raw traffic rate of 6.46 kb/s. The bottom four
plots correspond to four different jamming scenarios in which
we introduced a jammer. Throughout these four jamming sce-
narios, A is a CBR source. Looking at raw time series data, it
is clear that any statistic solely based on a moving average of
the RSSI values would be hard pressed to discriminate
between a normal traffic scenario and a reactive jammer sce-
nario. Furthermore, the shape of the RSSI time series for nor-
mal traffic scenarios and the reactive jammer are too similar
to rely on spectral discrimination techniques for discrimina-
tion. Further analysis of these methods and the difficulties
associated with using signal strength readings may be found in
[4]. Overall, these results suggest the following important
observation: we may not be able to use simple statistics, such
as average signal strength or energy, to discriminate jamming
scenarios from normal traffic scenarios because it is not
straightforward to devise a threshold that can separate these
two scenarios.
Carrier Sensing Time — A jammer can prevent a legitimate
source from sending out packets because the channel might
appear constantly busy to the source, and hence it might seem
possible to use carrier sensing time as a means to determine
whether a device is jammed. In [4] the authors explored this
possibility. We observed that using carrier sensing time is suit-
able when the following two conditions are true: the jammer
is non-reactive or non-random, and the underlying MAC pro-
tocol determines whether a channel is idle by comparing the
noise level with a fixed threshold. If these two conditions are
true, carrier sensing time is an efficient way to discriminate a
jammed scenario from a normal ill-functioning scenario, such
as congestion, because the sensing time will be bounded,
although large, in a congested situation, but unbounded in a
jammed situation. Overall, carrier sensing time alone cannot
be used to detect all the jamming scenarios. 
Packet Delivery Ratio — Similarly, PDR may be used to detect
the presence of jamming, as the jammer can effectively cor-
rupt transmissions, leading to a much lower PDR. Since a
jamming attack will degrade the channel quality surrounding a
node, the detection of a radio interference attack essentially
boils down to determining whether the communication node
can send or receive packets in the way it should have had the
jammer not been present. More formally, let us consider the
PDR between a sender and a receiver who are within radio
range of each other, assuming that the network only contains
these two nodes and that they are static. As noted earlier, an
effective jammer results in a very poor PDR, close to 0, which
indicates that PDR may be a good candidate in detecting jam-
ming attacks. We would like to point out that a nonaggressive
jammer, which only marginally affects the PDR, does not
cause noticeable damage to network quality and does not
need to be detected or defended against.
Next, we need to investigate how much PDR degradation
can be caused by non-jamming normal network dynamics,
such as congestion or failures at the sender side. Our studies
in [4] showed that even in a highly congested situation where
a raw traffic rate of 19.38 kb/s is offered to MICA2 radio
whose maximum bandwidth capacity is 12.364 kb/s at a 100
percent duty cycle, the PDR measured by the receiver is still
around 78 percent. As a result, a simple thresholding mecha-
nism based on the PDR value can be used to differentiate a
jamming attack, regardless of the jamming model, from a con-
gested network condition. Although PDR is quite effective in
discriminating jamming from congestion, it is not as effective
for other network dynamics, such as a sender battery failure,
or a sender moving out of a receiver’s communication range,
because these dynamics can result in sudden PDR drop in
much the same way as a jammer does. Specifically, if the
sender’s battery drains out, it stops sending packets, and the
corresponding PDR is 0 percent.
Consequently, compared to signal strength and carrier sens-
ing time, PDR is a more powerful statistic in that it can be
used to differentiate a jamming attack from a congested net-
work scenario for different jammer models. However, it still
cannot differentiate a jamming attack from other network
dynamics that can disrupt communication between a sender
and a receiver.
Advanced Detection Strategies
Rather than use such basic statistical methods, multimodal
strategies, such as combining PDR with signal strength read-
ings, appear to be promising. In a normal scenario with no
n Figure 2. RSSI readings as a function of time in different sce-
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interference, a high signal strength corresponds to a high
PDR. However, if the signal strength is low (i.e., the strength
of the signal is comparable to noise levels), the PDR will also
be low. On the other hand, a low PDR does not necessarily
imply a low signal strength: it may be that all of a node’s
neighbors have died (perhaps from consuming battery
resources or device faults), or the node is jammed. The key
observation here is that in the first case, the signal strength is
low, which is consistent with a low PDR measurement, while
in the jammed case, the signal strength should be high, which
contradicts the fact that the PDR is low.
Using these observations, we defined a multimodal consis-
tency check. During a guaranteed time of noninterfered net-
work operation, a table (PDR, SS) of typical packet delivery
ratios and signal strength values are measured. From this
data, one can calculate an upper bound for the maximum SS
that would have produced a particular PDR value in a non-
jammed scenario. Using this bound, the (PDR, SS) plane is
partitioned into a benign region and a jammed region. To
illustrate how such a detection scheme might operate, we pre-
sent the results of our investigation, which was conducted
using MICA2 Motes, in Fig. 3. We varied source-receiver sep-
aration for four different jammers. The PDR and SS readings
were averaged over a sufficient time window to remove
anomalous fluctuations (e.g. hardware-related or fading-relat-
ed variations). We found the 99 percent SS confidence levels
for different regions, and defined the jammed-region to be the
region of (PDR, SS) that is above the 99 percent signal
strength confidence intervals and whose PDR values are less
than 65 percent. As can be seen in Fig. 3, the (PDR, SS) val-
ues for all jammers distinctly fall within the jammed region,
suggesting that classification is feasible.
Mapping Jammed Areas
Following the detection of whether a node is jammed, it is
desirable for the network to map out regions of the sensor
network that are jammed. By having a map of jammed areas,
network services can use this knowledge to influence routing,
power management, and higher-layer planning. A protocol for
mapping out the jammed regions of a sensor network was pre-
sented in [9]. In this article jamming detection is performed
by monitoring channel utilization. Once the sensors observe
that their channel utility is below a preset threshold, they con-
clude that they are jammed. Following detection, the jammed
nodes bypass their MAC-layer temporarily and broadcast
JAMMED messages, announcing the fact that they are
jammed. These JAMMED messages will not be able to be
received by other jammed neighbors. However, those neigh-
bors on the boundary of the jammed region, but are not
themselves jammed themselves, will be able to hear the
JAMMED messages, though potentially at a higher error rate.
Once non-jammed sensors receive JAMMED messages, they
initiate the mapping procedure. These nonjammed nodes
exchange and merge information describing which nodes they
have witnessed as jammed, where those jammed sensors are
located, along with neighbor information. By continuing the
exchange of information regarding witnessed jammed nodes,
the network will eventually be able to map out the boundary
of a jammed area.
Evasion Defense Strategies
Security is a constant battle between the security expert and
the clever adversary; therefore, we have chosen to take inspi-
ration for our work from Sun Tze’s famous The Art of War:
He who cannot defeat his enemy should retreat.
Translating this philosophy into the wireless domain, two
strategies were recently proposed in [7] in order to defend
against jamming attacks: channel surfing and spatial retreats.
The underlying idea behind each strategy is to evade the
interferer, in either the spectral or physical sense.
Channel Surfing
Channel surfing is motivated by frequency hopping modula-
tion. Unlike frequency hopping, which is a PHY layer modu-
lation method involving continual changing of the carrier
frequency, the changing of frequencies in channel surfing is
on demand and operates at the link layer. Let us examine a
simple two-party communication scenario, as depicted in Fig.
4a, where adversary X1 or X2 has disrupted communication
between A and B. In channel surfing, both A and B change
their channel assignment to a new channel in order to avoid
X’s interference. Changing channels in the two-party sce-
nario is fairly straightforward. We have built a prototype
using the Berkeley MICA2 platform, in which A and B
detect whether they are jammed, switch to a new channel
(channel assignment is done using a pseudo-random genera-
tor), and re-establish connectivity when they detect each
other’s presence on the new channel [7]. Example results
depicting the PDR for the two-party channel surfing proto-
type are presented in Fig. 4b.
Extending the notion of channel surfing to more general
network scenarios, such as wireless LANs or ad hoc net-
works, is significantly more challenging. An initial outline of
such channel surfing strategies was presented in [7]. Imple-
menting these basic strategies, however, is a very difficult task
as reliably coordinating multiple devices switching to new
channels faces the usual challenges of distributed computing:
asynchrony, latency, and scalability. To address these chal-
lenges, we propose the following channel surfing variations:
coordinated channel switching and spectral multiplexing, dis-
cussed below.
In a coordinated channel switch, the entire network changes
its channel to a new channel. In such a scheme, when a node
detects that it is jammed, it switches channels and sends bea-
cons to announce its presence on the new channel. Boundary
nodes, which are not jammed but are neighbors of jammed
nodes, will detect the absence of their neighbors on the origi-
nal channel and probe the next channel to see if their neigh-
bors are still nearby. If a node detects beacons on the new
channel, it will switch back to the original channel and trans-
n Figure 3. (PDR, SS) measurements indicating the relationship
between PDR and signal strength, and the (PDR, SS) values for
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mit a broadcast message informing the entire network to
switch to the new channel.
Performing a coordinated channel switch across an entire
network incurs significant latency as the scale of the network
increases; as a result, the network may be in an unstable
phase where some devices are on an old channel while others
are waiting on the new channel. To alleviate the latency prob-
lem, we can have only jammed regions switch channels, and
have nodes on the boundary of a jammed region serve as
relay nodes between different spectral zones.
Spatial Retreats
We now explore spatial retreats, in which jammed nodes try
to evacuate from jammed regions. Spatial retreats are suit-
able for mobile sensor networks. Merely escaping from a
jammed region is not sufficient, however, as a mobile adver-
sary can move through the coverage area and cause large
swaths of the sensor network to relocate. By doing so, an
adversary can cause the network to become unevenly dis-
tributed, or even partitioned, thereby severing network com-
munications.
Therefore, spatial retreat strategies should be robust to
mobile jammers. In order to achieve this robustness, a spatial
retreat strategy should have two phases:
• Escape phase, in which the nodes located within the jammed
area move to “safe” regions, and stay connected with the
rest of the network
• Reconstruction phase, in which the mobile nodes move about
to achieve uniform network coverage, thereby preventing
the jammer from partitioning the network
Let us look at a robust escape strategy that has been devel-
oped. Suppose the network is connected before the jamming
attack; that is, every node within the jammed area is connect-
ed with nodes outside via one hop or multiple hops. In the
example shown in Fig. 5a, before the jamming attack, node A
was directly connected with A’, node B was directly connected
with B’, node D was directly connected with D’, and C was
connected with D’ via D. After the jamming attack is detect-
ed, the nodes within the jammed area choose a random direc-
tion to evacuate. While moving, each node continuously runs
the jamming detection algorithm until it leaves the jammed
area. As soon as it leaves the jammed area, it tests whether
there are some nodes within its radio range. If not, it moves
along the boundary of the jammed area until it reconnects to
the rest of the network. In Fig. 5a, if node A moves along the
boundary, it will eventually arrive at a location that is between
the location of A’ and the original location of A, where it can
reconnect to A’. The techniques that enable a node to move
along the boundary of the jammed area (Fig. 5b) are dis-
cussed in detail in [10].
If the jammer is mobile, its movement may cause the net-
work to become severely unbalanced, or even partitioned. As
an example, in the two figures on the left in Fig. 6, we depict
an initial network configuration (the top picture on the left),
and then introduce a jammer that moves in the y-direction
through the middle of the network. The result is a network
that is severely partitioned (bottom left). In order to address
this problem, we propose to apply the techniques of virtual
forces and potential fields, which are popular methods for
governing motion in robotic systems, to continuously repair
the network topology, regardless of the jammer movement.
To use virtual forces, we need three types of forces: the forces
between the nodes, the force from the boundary of the region,
and the force from the boundary of the jammed area. In
order to define the boundary of the jammed region, one must
use a jammed area mapping technique, such as the one pro-
posed in [9]. By carefully defining these forces and their inter-
plays, we can continually repair the network topology as
presented in [10]. We now examine the behavior of our robust
spatial retreat strategy by looking at an experiment involving a
mobile jammer cutting across the network coverage area. Fig-
ure 6 illustrates the evolution of the mobile sensor network’s
topology as the jammer moves through the network, and the
robust spatial retreat algorithm not only evacuates the jammed
area but also repairs regions left empty by the mobile jammer. 
Competition Strategies: Power Control and
Code Throttling
An alternative to performing evasion strategies, where the
sensor nodes try to evade the jammer in some sense, is to
have the sensors attempt to compete against the jammer. In
this case the objective should be for the sensors to improve
the reliability of the reception of their packets. This requires,
if a node detects it is jammed, that it will ignore the fact that
it is jammed, and transmit its packet anyway. In order for
nodes that are jammed, as well as nodes near jammed regions
(as mapped out using techniques proposed by [9]), to compete
against the jammer, they should adjust the coding and power
of their communications at the lower layers. By employing a
n Figure 4. a) Jammed two-party radio communication; b) PDR
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stronger error correcting code with a
lower information rate, we reduce the
overall throughput but increase the likeli-
hood of packets successfully being decod-
ed. We may also increase the
transmission power employed by legiti-
mate radio devices in order to allow
reception to operate at higher signal-to-
noise ratios. This strategy involves a
return to looking at the problem using
traditional communications theory, as
well as methods employed by the elec-
tronic warfare community. However,
there are some key differences that sug-
gest this direction of research will not fall
out immediately from traditional commu-
nications theory for anti-jamming, as
described in [1, 2]. In particular, since we
are operating in a system employing car-
rier sensing, it should be realized that
using increased power levels introduces
new problems as radio devices will have a larger radio cover-
age pattern, thereby increasing the likelihood of collisions and
unintentional interference with other legitimate radio devices.
Additionally, there are several systems-level issues that
need to be addressed when employing these methods. For
example, the work of [11] provides a theoretical study into the
use of low density parity check and Reed-Solomon codes to
cope with jamming, but does not address critical systems inte-
gration issues. Here, applying the ECC must be done in such
a way to protect the critical frame preamble and not just the
payload. Furthermore, it is necessary to develop protocols
that adaptively throttle code rates based upon a perceived
threat level. In particular, the detection mechanisms described
earlier should be modified in order to provide an estimate of
the severity of a jamming threat. This parameter will serve as
input into a protocol that will adaptively adjust power and
code rate. Taken together, these issues just outlined suggest
that an important direction for future exploration would
involve looking at the viability of combining power control
and code throttling in the presence of RF jamming.
Concluding Remarks
Due to the low-cost design of sensor nodes, and the ease with
which they may be reprogrammed, sensor networks will be
very susceptible to intentional radio interference attacks. This
article has surveyed both the attack and defend side of jam-
ming wireless sensor networks. Four different types of jam-
ming devices, which involved bypassing MAC layer carrier
sensing, have been discussed. We then turn to the problem of
detecting the presence of jamming, where we have illustrated
why simple statistics are not sufficient. Multimodal detection
methods have recently been proposed as a means to circum-
vent this challenge. Following detection, it is desirable that
the network can repair itself. Toward this end, two evasion
strategies have been discussed: the first involving the sensor
n Figure 5. Escaping from the jammed area: a) The network topology when the jamming
attack occurs — the jammed area is highlighted by the shaded area; b) the dashed line
marks the trace through which node A escapes from the jammed area and reconnects












n Figure 6. The two figures on the left illustrate that a mobile jammer can partition the network. The remaining figures depict the ability of
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network adapting its operating frequencies, the second suit-
able for mobile sensor networks and involving nodes relocat-
ing themselves. A different defense strategy involves sensors
trying to out-compete the jammer by employing error correct-
ing codes and increasing the node transmission power. Both
evasion and competition strategies are at an early stage of
investigation by the community, and as these techniques
mature an important area for study will be understanding and
classifying the scenarios where one defense strategy is advan-
tageous over another.
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